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ABSTRACT
With the development of smart devices, such as the Ama-
zon Echo and Apple’s HomePod, speech data have become
a new dimension of big data. However, privacy and security
concerns may hinder the collection and sharing of real-world
speech data, which contain the speaker’s identifiable infor-
mation, i.e., voiceprint, which is considered a type of biomet-
ric identifier. Current studies on voiceprint privacy protection
do not provide either a meaningful privacy-utility trade-off
or a formal and rigorous definition of privacy. In this study,
we design a novel and rigorous privacy metric for voiceprint
privacy, which is referred to as voice-indistinguishability, by
extending differential privacy. We also propose mechanisms
and frameworks for privacy-preserving speech data release
satisfying voice-indistinguishability. Experiments on public
datasets verify the effectiveness and efficiency of the pro-
posed methods.
Index Terms— Speaker de-identification, Speech Data
Release, Voiceprint, Differential Privacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the advance of voice-based human-computer interaction
and the development of smart devices, such as the Amazon
Echo and Apple’s Homepod, speech data have become a new
dimension of big data. The collection and sharing of real-
world speech data not only enables the improvement of inno-
vative services and products, such as Apple’s Siri and Google
Assistant but also fosters studies on intelligent algorithms.
However, privacy and security concerns may hinder the
collection and sharing of real-world speech data. First,
speech data contain the speaker’s identifiable information rep-
resented as voiceprint (as analogous to fingerprints), which is
considered a type of biometric identifier [1]. Therefore, with
the advent of the GDPR and increasing privacy concerns, the
sharing of speech data is faced with significant challenges [2].
Second, exposing an individual’s voiceprint may cause secu-
rity risks. Because voiceprints are used in many authentica-
The first three authors contributed equally to this work.
tion systems [1, 3], an attacker may commit spoong attacks
[4] to the voice authentication systems. Additionally, a vic-
tim may suffer from reputation attacks, as shown in a recent
study on fake Obama speeches [5].
Several methods [6, 7, 8, 9] for anonymizing speakers’
identities have been proposed to address these problems. A
naive way to protect voiceprint could be totally removing the
voiceprint by converting the speech records into texts and
releasing machine-generated voice by text-to-speech (TTS)
software [6]. Although these methods can effectively protect
voiceprint, the released speech data are not significantly use-
ful because the speech data not only include the linguistic in-
formation but also imply the speakers’ characteristics, such as
pitch, speaking rate, and emotion. Some other methods [7, 8]
provide a better utility of the released speech data by utiliz-
ing voice conversion but the privacy protection is based on
the hiding of the parameters used in the voice conversion. If
an attacker obtains these parameters, he can reverse engineer
to the original voice. A recent study [9] proposed a speaker
anonymization system by extending the k-anonymity model
[10]. However, numerous studies [11, 12] on data privacy in-
dicate that k-anonymity is less rigorous in many real-world
applications because it is based on the assumptions of the at-
tackers’ background knowledge.
Contributions. In this study, for the first time, we de-
sign a novel and rigorous privacy metric for voiceprint privacy
by extending differential privacy [13] for privacy-preserving
speech data release. First, we design a formal privacy no-
tion for voiceprint, called voice-indistinguishability, whose
privacy guarantee does not depend on adversarial knowledge.
We use the state-of-the-art representation of voiceprint, i.e.,
the x-vector [14]. The definition provides different degrees
of indistinguishability for every two x-vectors according to
their distance (i.e., similarity). Second, we design a mecha-
nism satisfying voice-indistinguishability and analyze the pri-
vacy guarantee provided by our definition, which is limiting
the information an adversary can obtain. Third, we propose
privacy-preserving speech data release frameworks based on
voice synthesis techniques. We verify the effectiveness and
efficiency of the proposed methods on public speech datasets.
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Fig. 1. Privacy-preserving speech data release (the red and
blue indicate the sensitive and protected data, respectively).
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Voiceprint: what we intend to protect
Voice is a hybrid of physiological and behavioral identifiers.
As mentioned previously, voiceprint is an important biomet-
ric characteristic that only reflects the physiological identifier
of voice. Voiceprint has the following characteristics: (1) Sta-
bleness: Voiceprint is relatively stable regardless of speakers’
environmental and psychological changes; (2) Naturalness:
Because voiceprint is a natural characteristic of voice, it is
not limited to specific scenarios.
2.2. Problem Setting
In this study, we aim to protect voiceprint in the privacy-
preserving speech data release. In other words, the pub-
lished speech database should ensure that the voiceprint em-
bedded therein is indistinguishable. Figure 1 shows the
privacy-preserving speech data release process. For each
raw utterance, we extract its content and voiceprint, after
which we sanitize the extracted voiceprint. We use D =
{u1, u2, ..., un} to denote the speech database where ui rep-
resents the ith utterance of the speech database and D =
{x1, x2, ..., xn}, x ∈ X to denote the voiceprint database ex-
tracted from D, where X is the voiceprint domain. Note that
D and D share the same size, n.
3. VOICE-INDISTINGUISHABILITY
3.1. Privacy Definition and Mechanism
When considering the achievement of the indistinguishability
of voiceprint, differential privacy [13] seems to be a satisfying
solution. Differential privacy is a state-of-the-art paradigm
facilitating the secure analysis of sensitive data, owing to its
strong assumption of an adversary’s background knowledge
and its smart setting of the privacy budget. However, differ-
ential privacy proposed for databases cannot be directly ap-
plied. Alternatively, we consider a generalized differential
privacy known as metric privacy [15]. Metric privacy defines
a distance metric between secrets and guarantees the indistin-
guishability of every two secrets to the extent that is propor-
tional to the distance between each.
Metric privacy: A mechanism K : X → P(Z) that sat-
isfies dX -privacy, only if ∀x, x′ ∈ X
K(x)(Z) ≤ edX (x,x′)K(x′)(Z) ∀Z ∈ FZ (1)
where dX is a distance metric for X , Z is a set of query out-
comes, FZ is a σ-algebra over Z , and P(Z) is the set of
probability measures over Z .
Inspired by geo-indistinguishability [16] and image ob-
fuscation [17], which extend metric privacy to location data
and images, we design a formal privacy notion for speech
data. As shown in Equation (1), the components of metric
privacy are the representation of secrets and the distance be-
tween two secrets. In our case, the secrets are the speakers’
voiceprints in a speech database. We discuss the representa-
tion of the voiceprint and the distance metric below.
Representation of the voiceprint. The representa-
tion of voiceprint is based on models or templates. Stud-
ies on voiceprint/speaker recognition algorithms represent
voiceprints as features of each vocal cavity, which can fully
express the differences of voices. The Gaussian mixture
model (GMM) super-vector [18], the joint factor analysis
(JFA) [19], and the i-vector [20] are the main GMM-based
methods. When a DNN is used for voiceprint/speaker recog-
nition, the GMM is replaced by the output of the DNN (d-
vector) [21]. The DNN-based embedding (x-vector) [14] is a
state-of-the-art technology. The x-vector-based speaker ver-
ification approach produces utterance-level embeddings even
for variable-length speech segments. Thus, we choose the x-
vector as the representation of voiceprint. We use the same
setting used by Snyder et al. [14] and present more technical
details about the x-vector in Subsection 5.2.1.
Definition of the distance. Similar to l1 norm used in
differential privacy that measures the similarity between two
neighboring databases, we also need a distance metric over
voiceprints. The distance between x-vectors should be a met-
ric (i.e., it should satisfy triangle inequality) required by met-
ric privacy. Cosine distance could be a candidate since it
is widely used in measuring the distance between x-vectors
[22], but it is not a well-defined distance metric, as it does
not satisfy the triangle inequality property. We propose to use
angular distance , which satisfies the inequality property and
preserves the similarity between voiceprints.
In the following, we propose a voiceprint privacy defini-
tion for a single utterance and for a speech database in Defi-
nition 1 and Definitions 2, respectively.
Definition 1 (Voice-Indistinguishability, i.e., Voice-Ind)
A mechanism K satisfies -voice-indistinguishability if for
any output x˜ and any two possible voiceprints x, x′ ∈ X :
Pr(x˜|x)
Pr(x˜|x′) ≤ e
dX (x,x′)
dX =
arccos(cos similarity < x, x′ >)
pi
(2)
where X is a set of possible voiceprints, dX is the angular
distance metric, cos similarity is a measure of similarity be-
tween two vectors of an inner product space that measures the
cosine of the angle between them.
Definition 2 (Speech data release under Voice-Ind) For
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Fig. 2. Example of a privacy-preserving speech data release.
every two neighboring x-vector databases D,D′, only differ-
ing in the ith x-vector, which are x, and x′, a mechanism
K satisfies -voice-indistinguishability if for all possible per-
turbed x-vector databases D˜
Pr(D˜|D)
Pr(D˜|D′) ≤ e
d(D,D′) (3)
where d(D,D′) = dX (x, x′). It can be easily found that when
the database D approaches X , the above mentioned defini-
tions are the same.
Voice-Indistinguishability guarantees that given the out-
put x-vector x˜, an attacker hardly distinguishes whether the
original x-vector is x or x′ bounded by dX . In other words,
a lower dX indicates higher indistinguishability, hence a
higher level of privacy. The privacy budget value  globally
influences the degree of guaranteed privacy.
Mechanism. According to the definition, we provide a
probable mechanism. Given the input x-vector x0, the mech-
anism K perturbs x0 by randomly selecting an x-vector x˜ in
the dataset D according to certain probability distributions,
thus providing plausible deniability for x0.
Theorem 1. A mechanism K that randomly transforms
x0 to x˜ where x0, x˜ ∈ D according to the following equation,
satisfies voice-indistinguishability
Pr(x˜|x0) ∝ e−dX (x0,x˜)
3.2. Privacy Analysis
Privacy guarantee of the released private speech database.
Figure 2 shows an example of the speech database before and
after transformation using the proposed mechanism. Voice-
indistinguishability guarantees that an attacker can hardly dis-
tinguish whether the original voiceprint is from A, B, or C.
Privacy guarantee of voice-indistinguishability. We
further explain the privacy guarantee provided by voice-
indistinguishability by comparing the prior and posterior dis-
tributions of information obtained by an adversary. We prove
that the prior and posterior distributions are bounded by dX .
In other words, voice-indistinguishability does not impose
that an adversary gains no information but limits the increase
of information that an adversary can obtain.
Let Pr(x) and Pr(x | x˜) be the prior and posterior distri-
butions of information obtained by an adversary, respectively,
then for two indistinguishable x-vectors x, x′:
lg
Pr(x˜|x)
Pr(x˜|x′) = lg
Pr(x | x˜)
Pr(x′ | x˜) − lg
Pr(x)
Pr(x′)
≤ dX (x, x′)
Fig. 3. The proposed frameworks.
4. PRIVATE SPEECH DATA RELEASE
FRAMEWORK
We adopt a framework that is similar to speaker anonymiza-
tion using the x-vector proposed by Fang et al. [9], which is
based on feature-level perturbation. However, this framework
is time-consuming for a large speech database because the on-
line perturbation time with n records is O(n2). To improve
the time complexity, we propose a Model-level framework.
Figure 3 shows these two frameworks. Both frameworks
use two modules to generate the speech data: An end-to-end
acoustic model that generates a Mel-spectrogram (Mel-spec)
(used as a standard input feature in speech synthesis) given
the two input features; filter-bank (Fbank) (a commonly used
feature for speech recognition) and an x-vector.
Algorithm 1 Feature-level framework
Input: Raw utterance u0, Utterance database D,
Synthesize model Syn
Output: Protected utterance u˜0
1: Extract Fbank fbank0 and x-vector x0 from u0 Fig.3(a) 1©
2: for each utterance ui ∈ D do
3: Extract x-vector xi from ui
4: Compute Pr(xi|x0)
5: end for
6: Select x-vector x˜ randomly according to Pr(x˜|x0) Fig.3(a) 2©
7: Mel-spec← Syn(fbank0, x˜) Fig.3(a) 3©
8: u˜0←Waveform vocoder(Mel-spec) Fig.3(a) 4©
9: return u˜0 Fig.3(a) 5©
Algorithm 2 Model-level framework
Input: Raw utterance u0, Utterance database D,
Perturbed synthesize model ˜Syn
Output: Protected utterance u˜0
1: Extract Fbank fbank0 and x-vector x0 from u0 Fig.3(b) 1©
2: Mel-spec← ˜Syn(fbank0, x0) Fig.3(b) 2©
3: u˜0←Waveform vocoder(Mel-spec) Fig.3(b) 3©
4: return u˜0 Fig.3(b) 4©
The only difference between the Feature-level framework
and the Model-level framework is seen when we perturb the
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Layers Layer context #context #units
time-delay 1 [t− 2, t+ 2] 5 512
time-delay 2 {t− 2, t, t+ 2} 9 512
time-delay 3 {t− 3, t, t+ 3} 15 512
time-delay 4 {t} 15 512
time-delay 5 {t} 15 1500
statistics pooling [0, T ) T 3000
bottleneck 1 {0} T 512
bottleneck 2 {0} T 512
softmax {0} T L
Table 1. The x-vector TDNN. T is the number of frames in a
given utterance. L is the number of speakers.
x-vector. As shown in Algorithm 1, Figures 3(a) directly add
the perturbation to the x-vector before voice synthesis, which
represents a Feature-level framework. As shown in Algorithm
2, Figures 3(b) perturb all utterances, then re-train the syn-
thesis model, so that it learns the perturbation rules, which
represents a Model-level framework.
5. EXPERIMENTS
5.1. Experimental Setting
We verify the accuracy of voice-indistinguishability in this
section. Because  represents our privacy budget, modified
speech data with a larger  has a weaker capacity for mitigat-
ing speaker verification attacks but better utility. Both objec-
tive and subjective evaluations are carried out.
The proposed frameworks are built using the End-to-End
speech synthesis toolkit [23] on default settings. We use the
evaluation set of the Librispeech dataset [24] (test-clean) to
simulate the proposed frameworks. This dataset consists of 5
hours, 24 min of data, and a total of 40 speakers consisting of
20 males and 20 females.
For objective evaluation, we test the difference between
the original voices and the modified voices using the Mean
Squared Error (MSE), and whether they are recognized as the
same person using speaker verification as discussed in Sub-
section 5.2.1. In Subsection 5.2.2, we also test whether a
speech recognition system, which is a utility of speech data,
can still recognize the modified speech. For subjective eval-
uation, we invite 15 listeners to evaluate the differences be-
tween the original and modified speaker voices, and the nat-
uralness of the modified voices. This evaluation is described
in Subsection 5.3. Finally, we compare the two frameworks
in Subsection 5.4.
5.2. Objective Evaluation
5.2.1. Speaker Verification System and Evaluation
We use the open-source x-vector system pre-trained on the
augmented VoxCeleb-1 [25] and VoxCeleb-2 datasets [26].
https://github.com/espnet/espnet/tree/master/egs/librispeech/tts1
http://kaldi-asr.org/models/m8
Fig. 4. Vary n (speech database size) and  (privacy budget)
The PLDA model is used to evaluate the similarities between
the original voices and their modifications. The PLDA model
is trained using the speakers in the wild (SITW) dataset [27].
Table 1 shows the architecture of the x-vector extrac-
tor. It consists of the context-aggregating time-delay neural
network (TDNN) [28] layers operating at frame level (with
the final context window of ±7 frames), a statistics pooling
layer which computes the mean and standard deviation of all
the frames, effectively changing the variable-length sequence
of frame-level activations into a fixed-length vector, and an
utterance-level part consisting of two fully connected bot-
tleneck layers which extract more sophisticated features and
compress the information into a lower-dimensional space, and
an additional softmax output layer.
We evaluate the effect of the size of the speech database
and the privacy budget  on the changes between the origi-
nal voices and the modified voices. The Mean Squared Er-
ror (MSE) and the accuracy of speaker verification through
PLDA (ACC) are used. From the results shown in Figure 4,
we can conclude that the capacity for mitigating speaker ver-
ification attacks is higher with a larger speech database size
and lower , which means higher level of guaranteed privacy.
5.2.2. Speech Recognition System and Evaluation
We use the Mozzilla DeepSpeech framework to construct
the speech recognition system. We train a three-layer bidi-
rectional long short term memory (BLSTM)-based neural
network using the training set of Librispeech (train-clean-
100). The model is trained using connectionist-temporal-
classification (CTC [29]) objective and character-level labels.
https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech
http://www.openslr.org/11/
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The words in the labels are converted into 26 characters and 3
special tokens (“”’ mark, space and blank). This network uses
the 161 dim spectrogram features extracted from waveform
files. Each layer uses 100 gated cells and the ReLU activation
function. The Batch-normalization and dropout techniques
(drop-rate=0.48) are used between layers to ensure training
stability. The output layer has 29-dimensional outputs repre-
senting the 29 characters in the label.
For testing, the character level accuracy is calculated. We
use the character error rate (CER) to evaluate the performance
of speech recognition for protected speech data after perturb-
ing the voiceprint. Figure 5 shows a lower CER with a larger
 that is consistent with our definition that a larger  results
in better utility. Note that a small  may have the same per-
formances because our mechanism is based on randomness.
Fig. 5. Character Error Rate (CER)
5.3. Subjective Evaluation
We invite 15 listeners to measure the speaker’s differences
between the original voices and the modified voices and the
naturalness of sounds that closely resemble the human voice.
The MOS (Mean Opinion Score) is used to evaluate the gen-
erated sound. In this study, dissimilarity means the degree of
privacy that we protect while naturalness means the utility of
the modified speech data. As shown in Figure 6, the result of
MOS is in accordance with the objective evaluation.
Fig. 6. Dissimilarity and Naturalness
5.4. Comparison of the Proposed Frameworks
Based on the same mechanism, the proposed frameworks,
the Feature-level framework, and the Model-based framework
share similar performances as discussed above. However,
Speech database size n = 100 n = 1000 n = 10000
Perturbation time 0.4802s 29.0959s 2710.9289s
Table 2. The online perturbation time.
without perturbation during testing, the time complexity of
the Model-level framework shows a reduction of O(n2).
As shown in Table 2, the Feature-level framework using
online perturbation time is time-consuming when n is large.
This proves that the Model-level framework outperforms the
Feature-level framework in time complexity.
6. RELATED WORKS
Speaker de-identification [6, 7, 8, 9, 30] seeks to change
the identity information without affecting the textual content.
The existing speaker de-identification algorithms include:
(1) Voice-level Protection. Voice-level Algorithms are
based on voice conversion. They construct a mapping from
the source voice to the target voice. VoiceMask as described
by Qian et al., [7] does such mapping based on vocal tract
length normalization (VTLN), which is a well-studied voice
conversion technology that uses frequency warping. Srivas-
tava et al. [8] propose another VTLN-based approach that
warps the frequency axis in different directions over time. It
can be concluded that both of them provide no intuitive defi-
nition of voiceprint.
(2) Feature-level Protection. Feature-level algorithms
are based on voice synthesis. Justin et al. [6] propose an
approach that transforms all the speakers’ voices to that of a
specific speaker. Similarly, speaker anonymization using the
x-vector and neural waveform models is discussed by Fang et
al. [9]. The main assumption is that speech waveform can be
anatomized by altering the features that encode the speaker’s
identity. These two methods indeed protect the voiceprint of
voices but do not point out the degree of voiceprint protection
that they provide.
(3) Model-level Protection. Srivastava et al. [30] point
out that the content feature obtained from a standard au-
tomatic speech recognition (ASR) architecture still carries
abundant information regarding speaker identity. They use
adversarial training to learn the content feature while hiding
speaker identity. However, their approach has a limited effect
on the accuracy of speaker validation.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This study proposes a privacy definition for voiceprint, voice-
indistinguishability, and present a speaker de-identification
solution using two frameworks. Consequently, our solu-
tion achieves a balanced trade-off between privacy and util-
ity. Both objective and subjective evaluations prove that our
method can mitigate speaker verification attacks and achieve
an improved performance of speech recognition. In future
5
studies, we shall propose mechanisms with better utility and
broadly evaluate the applicability of the frameworks.
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